

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10

IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05

SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /094 W

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FM USMISSION USNATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1463

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE BE

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 04706

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: ASSOCIATED MEASURES AND NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

- OF VERIFICATION

REF: (A) AC/276-WP(75)2 10 JANUARY 1975, (B) AC/276-D

- (75)1 3 MARCH 1975, (C) STATE 87491 DTG

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SUMMARY: AS THE RESUMED ALLIED DISCUSSION OF MBFR STABILIZING MEASURES AND VERIFICATION PROCEEDS, THE LONG DORMANT ISSUE OF NEGOTIATED MEASURES VERSUS NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM) MAY BE REVIVED. WE FLAG THIS ISSUE WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT WASHINGTON THINK AHEAD REGARDING QUESTIONS THAT MAY BE RAISED ABOUT CURRENT US NTMS CAPABILITIES AND US WILLINGNESS TO SHARE NTMS INTELLIGENCE RELEVANT TO MBFR WITH THE ALLIES. END SUMMARY.

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1. A FEW YEARS AGO WHEN THIS QUESTION WAS ACTIVE, SMALLER ALLIES (PARTICULARLY BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS) SUPPORTED COMPREHENSIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES IN MBFR PARTLY TO ENSURE THAT THEY WOULD KNOW WHETHER AN MBFR AGREEMENT WAS BEING OBSERVED AND PARTLY TO INSURE THEIR BROAD PARTICIPATION IN THE VERIFICATION PROCESS.

FOR EXAMPLE, SMALLER ALLIES VIEWED AERIAL INSPECTION AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, MOBILE TEAMS AS IDEAL MEANS TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN ANY VERIFICATION SYSTEM. THE FRG, HOWEVER, SAW "NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS" AS THE MAIN ELEMENT IN THE MBFR VERIFICATION PROCESS AND A FEW, LIMITED MULTILATERALLY NEGOTIATED NATIONAL VERIFICATION PROCEDURES AS USEFUL AND DESIRABLE BUT NOT VITAL. THE US WAS, AS WE RECALL, INTERESTED IN EXPLORING A RANGE OF NEGOTIATED MEASURES BUT WAS RELATIVELY FLEXIBLE, SINCE IT WOULD KNOW THE MOST ABOUT VERIFICATION, AND COULD PROBABLY ACCEPT A COMPROMISE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SMALLER ALLIES AND THE FRG.

2. THE FRG WAS NEVER ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT MOBILE TEAMS OR AIRCRAFT PROWLING ABOUT ITS TERRITORY AND AIRSPACE TO VERIFY AN MBFR AGREEMENT. ASIDE FROM THE DRAWBACKS OF SUCH INTRUSION, THE FRG WAS, AND REMAINS, LEERY OF A NARROW VERIFICATION ZONE IN EUROPE IN WHICH THE FRG WOULD BE A PRIMARY FOCUS. THE FRG PLACED ON RECORD IN 1975 ITS VIEW (REF A) THAT VERIFICATION OTHER THAN AGREED ENTRY/EXIT POINTS "SHOULD BE ESSENTIALLY BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS" FOR WHICH THE FRG ASSUMED "A HIGH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND DISSOLUTION (SIC) CAPABILITY". WHEN THE FRG LAST MADE THIS JUDGMENT IN 1975, IT NOTED THAT THE US HAD NOT ANSWERED ITS EARLIER QUESTIONS ON "WHAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS CAN DO OR  
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NOT DO".

3. WHILE IT IS CLEAR THAT NTMS WILL BE THE MAJOR US TOOL FOR VERIFYING AN MBFR AGREEMENT, THE US STABILIZING MEASURES PAPER (REF C) CONTINUES TO SUPPORT A FULL RANGE OF VERIFICATION THROUGH NEGOTIATED MEANS. THE US HAS THUS MAINTAINED AN APPROACH THAT ACCORDS WITH BASIC ALLIANCE POLICY (AS REFLECTED IN DOCUMENTATION SUCH AS CM(73)83) ON THE IMPORTANCE OF AN OVERT VERIFICATION SYSTEM.

4. AS ALLIES SEEK TO DETERMINE IN FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES HOW MUCH "REAL" VERIFICATION CAPABILITY WOULD BE SACRIFICED BY DROPPING OR CURTAILING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON STABILIZING/VERIFICATION MEASURES, THEY MAY WELL SEEK TO DETERMINE TO WHAT DEGREE US NTMS WILL PROVIDE THE SAME LEVEL OF ASSURANCE AND, MORE POINTEDLY, WHETHER THE US WILL MAKE THIS INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO ITS ALLIES. THE LAST SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT ON THE CAPABILITY OF US NTMS, THAT WE CAN DIG UP, APPEARS TO BE AN APRIL 1973 PAPER, "THE UNITED STATES APPROACH TO MBFR" (ANNEX E), IN WHICH WE OFFERED

ESTIMATES ON THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED TO VERIFY  
SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS AND TO IDENTIFY CERTAIN  
CATEGORIES OF VIOLATIONS.

5. AS THE DISCUSSION PROCEEDS, WE WOULD EXPECT THE  
FRG TO ARGUE, IN DEFENSE OF ITS POSITION ON VERIFICATION,  
THAT NOT ONLY ARE CERTAIN VERIFICATION MEASURES POLITI-  
CALLY INTRUSIVE BUT ALSO THAT THEY ARE UNNECESSARY FOR  
EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. IN THAT CONTEXT, THE FRG COULD  
PRESS FOR A RESPONSE TO ITS LONGSTANDING QUERY ON THE

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CAPABILITY OF US NTMS AND QUESTIONS MAY BE RAISED  
ABOUT US WILLINGNESS TO SHARE MBFR RELEVANT INTELLIGENCE  
WITH THE ALLIES.

6. SUCH QUESTIONS COULD POSE A DILEMMA FOR THE US.  
IF WE RESPONDED BY IMPLYING THAT US NTM INFORMATION  
WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE "AS REQUIRED", WE MIGHT  
STIMULATE HIGH EXPECTATIONS ON THE PART OF SMALLER  
ALLIES AND PERHAPS LEAD THEM TO SOFTEN THEIR REQUIREMENTS  
FOR A SIGNIFICANT NEGOTIATED VERIFICATION.

7. ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD WE INDICATE THAT US  
NTM INTELLIGENCE IS UNLIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE TO NATO,  
WE WOULD REINFORCE THE DESIRES OF SMALLER ALLIES TO  
OBTAIN A STRONG SET OF OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES.

SUCH DESIRES WOULD PUT ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON THE FRG TO RELAX ITS OPPOSITION TO SUCH MEASURES AND COULD PROVE DIVISIVE OR SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY ANY ALLIED MBFR PROPOSAL ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES.

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8. WE FLAG THIS PROBLEM BECAUSE IT IS LIKELY TO CROP UP AGAIN, AND WE MAY NEED TO SEEK WASHINGTON GUIDANCE ON THE US POSITION ON

(A) THE RELATIVE CAPABILITIES OF NTMS VS NEGOTIATED MEANS FOR VERIFYING AN MBFR AGREEMENT. (IT STRIKES US THAT WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO REVIEW THE 1973 POSITION ON NTM CAPABILITY IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE OF THE ART OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS); AND

(B) THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO SHARE MBFR RELEVANT NTM INTELLIGENCE WITH NATO ALLIES.  
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## Message Attributes

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